University of North Carolina School of Law

Carolina Law Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

2012

National Healthcare and American Constitutional Culture
William P. Marshall
University of North Carolina School of Law, wpm@email.unc.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Law Commons

Publication: Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Carolina Law Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Carolina
Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

NATIONAL HEALTHCARE AND AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE
WILLIAM P. MARSHALL*

There is no serious constitutional argument of which I am
aware suggesting that the federal government cannot provide
free healthcare to every individual in the United States.1 Nor is
there any sound constitutional claim that the United States
could not raise taxes or find other sources of revenue to fund
such a program.2
But as the public reaction to the passage of the Patient Pro‐
tection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA)3 makes clear,4 the
constitutional debate over national healthcare is more than a
debate over the specifics of constitutional law. Rather it is de‐
bate grounded in constitutional culture—or what may be de‐
scribed as the non‐legal traditions, narratives, and understand‐
ings that constitute our sense of American exceptionalism5 and
help define who we are as a nation and as a people.6
This Article addresses whether the creation of a national
healthcare program would be consistent with American consti‐
tutional culture. Part I briefly expands upon the legal point that
there is no constitutional barrier to the enactment of a national
healthcare system. Part II.A then identifies and discusses the
two aspects of our constitutional culture that militate against
the adoption of national healthcare—our belief in rugged indi‐
* Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. I am grateful to Gene
Nichol, Melissa Jacoby, and Richard Myers for their comments on an earlier draft
of this article and to Katherine Slager for her tireless research assistance.
1. See infra Part I (discussing Congressional power under the Spending Clause).
2. See id. (discussing the federal power under the Taxing Clause).
3. Pub. L. No. 111‐148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
4. For an overview of Americans’ immediate reactions to the passage of
PPACA, see Lydia Saad, By Slim Margin, Americans Support Healthcare Bill’s Pas‐
sage, GALLUP, Mar. 23, 2010, http://www.gallup.com/poll/126929/slim‐margin‐
americans‐support‐healthcare‐bill‐passage.aspx.
5. See generally Jeremy Rabkin, American Exceptionalism and the Healthcare Reform
Debate, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 153 (2012).
6. See infra Part II.B.
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vidualism and our distrust of government. As this Part notes,
our national commitment to these narratives is deep and well‐
founded. But our national commitment to both of these aspects
of our constitutional culture is necessarily measured. Neither
the commitment to individualism nor to distrust of govern‐
ment is unlimited in scope; both are constrained by strong and
compelling countervailing concerns. Part II.B then presents two
equally fundamental aspects of our constitutional culture that
support the adoption of a national healthcare system—our
commitment to social mobility and our vision of the United
States as a land of equal opportunity. This Article concludes
that national healthcare fits well within our constitutional tra‐
ditions and comports with the aspects of American exception‐
alism that best define who we are as a nation.
One important caveat: This Article does not purport to ad‐
dress the specific constitutional claims that have been raised in
relation to PPACA. Although I believe that PPACA is constitu‐
tional,7 my comments are aimed at the provision of a system of
national healthcare more generally.
I.

NATIONAL HEALTHCARE AND CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE

It is perhaps not surprising to learn that the passage of Social
Security in the 1930s was met with many of the same heated
criticisms now aimed at national healthcare.8 Then, as now,
opponents argued that enacting such a program would exceed
the constitutional powers of the federal government.9 Then, as
now, opponents argued that the program was fundamentally
inconsistent with the vision of limited government and indi‐
vidual freedom that was central to our constitutional founda‐
tions.10 Then, as now, opponents frequently peppered their po‐
litical rhetoric against Social Security with the claim that the
program was akin to socialism.11

7. See Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 895 (E.D. Mich.
2010) (upholding the constitutionality of the individual mandate) aff’d 651 F.3d
529 (6th Cir. 2011).
8. See generally NANCY J. ALTMAN, THE BATTLE FOR SOCIAL SECURITY: FROM
FDR’S VISION TO BUSH’S GAMBLE (2005).
9. See id. at 48.
10. Cf. id. at 50.
11. Id. at 73.
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Despite heated political opposition, the Social Security Act
(SSA)12 passed, but like the passage of the PPACA, statutory
enactment did not end the controversy. The battle moved to
the courts where opponents argued the SSA was unconstitu‐
tional. The challengers relied primarily on Article I of the
Constitution, asserting that in enacting the SSA, the Con‐
gress exceeded its enumerated powers, and on the Tenth
Amendment, arguing that the “powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the peo‐
ple.”13 They did not succeed. The Supreme Court, in two ma‐
jor decisions issued on the same day—Helvering v. Davis14
and Steward Machine Co. v. Davis15—found constitutional au‐
thority for Congress to create the Social Security program in
the expansive wording of Article I, Section 8, Clause 1,
which grants Congress the power to tax and spend for “the
general Welfare of the United States.”16 The Court therefore
ruled that the Social Security Act was constitutional.17
The Court in Helvering and Steward Machine understood
that its reading of the Taxing and Spending Clause might be
controversial18 and that the debate over the meaning of the
Clause dated back to the time of the Framers. James Madi‐
12. Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935).
13. U.S. CONST. amend X.
14. 301 U.S. 619 (1937). The argument in Helvering against the Social Security Act’s
constitutionality rested on the objection that the payroll tax required of employers
was not a tax allowed under the Constitution because Congress had no power to tax
and spend for the purposes of providing welfare assistance. Id. at 639.
15. 301 U.S. 548 (1937). In Steward Machine, the plaintiffs argued that unemploy‐
ment provisions of the Social Security Act were unconstitutional because the unem‐
ployment tax was not an excise tax and was therefore beyond the bounds of the
federal government because Congress had no power to tax and spend for the pur‐
poses of providing unemployment assistance. Id. at 578. The challengers also as‐
serted that the Act was unconstitutional because it operated to coerce the States, and
thus violated principles of state sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment. See id.
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and col‐
lect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts
and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States . . . .”).
17. See Steward Mach., 301 U.S. at 598; see also Helvering, 301 U.S. at 645–46. In a
companion case also decided the same day, Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co.,
301 U.S. 495, 514 (1937), the Court reaffirmed the holdings of Helvering and Stew‐
ard Machine in a challenge to the state portion of the federal‐state arrangement
under the Social Security Act. Id. at 527.
18. See Steward Mach., 301. U.S. at 592; Helvering, 301 U.S. at 639–40.
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son, for example, believed the Taxing and Spending Clause
did no more than allow Congress to tax and spend in refer‐
ence to its enumerated powers.19 Alexander Hamilton, in
contrast, asserted that the Clause provided Congress with
independent authority.20 The Court in Helvering and Steward
Machine concluded, however, that by the time of the Social
Security decisions, the issue had been resolved in favor of
Hamilton’s view.21 Justice Story, writing in the early nine‐
teenth century, had adopted Hamilton’s position in his
Commentaries22 and the Court itself, relying in part on Jus‐
tice Story’s reasoning, had held in United States v. Butler that
the broader Hamiltonian reading of the Taxing and Spend‐
ing Clause was the correct one.23

19. THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison).
20. See ALEXANDER HAMILTON, REPORT ON MANUFACTURES 41 (Dec. 5, 1791)
(written in his position as Secretary of the Treasury).
21. See, e.g., Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640.
22. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936).
23. See id. As the Butler Court stated:
Since the foundation of the nation, sharp differences of opinion have
persisted as to the true interpretation of the phrase. Madison asserted it
amounted to no more than a reference to the other powers enumerated in
the subsequent clauses of the same section; that, as the United States is a
government of limited and enumerated powers, the grant of power to tax
and spend for the general national welfare must be confined to the
enumerated legislative fields committed to the Congress. In this view the
phrase is mere tautology, for taxation and appropriation are or may be
necessary incidents of the exercise of any of the enumerated legislative
powers. Hamilton, on the other hand, maintained the clause confers a
power separate and distinct from those later enumerated, is not restricted in
meaning by the grant of them, and Congress consequently has a
substantive power to tax and to appropriate, limited only by the
requirement that it shall be exercised to provide for the general welfare of
the United States. Each contention has had the support of those whose
views are entitled to weight. This court has noticed the question, but has
never found it necessary to decide which is the true construction. Mr.
Justice Story, in his Commentaries, espouses the Hamiltonian position. We
shall not review the writings of public men and commentators or discuss
the legislative practice. Study of all these leads us to conclude that the
reading advocated by Mr. Justice Story is the correct one. While, therefore,
the power to tax is not unlimited, its confines are set in the clause which
confers it, and not in those of section 8 which bestow and define the
legislative powers of the Congress. It results that the power of Congress to
authorize expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not limited
by the direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution.
Id. at 65–66 (internal citations omitted).
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The only matter then remaining for the Court in Helvering
and Steward Machine was whether the creation of a Social Secu‐
rity system comported with the requirement under the Taxing
and Spending Clause that Congress act in furtherance of the
“general welfare.” The Court held that the judgment of what is
for the general welfare was a matter for Congress and not the
courts to decide. Accordingly, it concluded that it would defer
to Congress on this issue “unless the choice is clearly wrong, a
display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment.”24 Ad‐
ditionally, despite ruling that it need not provide justifications
supporting Congress’s decision to create a Social Security sys‐
tem, the Court offered one anyway:
The purge of nation‐wide calamity that began in 1929 has
taught us many lessons. Not the least is the solidarity of in‐
terests that may once have seemed to be divided. Unem‐
ployment spreads from state to state, the hinterland now set‐
tled that in pioneer days gave an avenue of escape.
Spreading from state to state, unemployment is an ill not
particular but general, which may be checked, if Congress so
determines, by the resources of the nation. If this can have
been doubtful until now, our ruling today in the case of the
Steward Machine Co. has set the doubt at rest. But the ill is
all one or at least not greatly different whether men are
thrown out of work because there is no longer work to do or
because the disabilities of age make them incapable of doing
it. Rescue becomes necessary irrespective of the cause. The
hope behind this statute is to save men and women from the
rigors of the poor house as well as from the haunting fear
that such a lot awaits them when journeyʹs end is near.25

The Social Security cases and their antecedent authorities thus
provide little doubt that a national healthcare program would
survive constitutional scrutiny under current doctrine. If Con‐
gress has the authority to tax and spend to provide cash payments
to individual citizens, it would also have the authority to provide
healthcare. This is not to say that a national healthcare program
might not raise substantial constitutional issues in the manner in
which it is designed or in the specifics of its requirements. Those
currently challenging the constitutionality of PPACA, for exam‐
ple, are specifically claiming that PPACA’s individual mandate
24. Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640.
25. Id. at 641 (internal citations omitted).
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provisions violate the Commerce Clause.26 But even if the plain‐
tiffs succeed in their Commerce Clause challenge, the result
would only be that the individual mandate would be found un‐
constitutional.27 The conclusion would not be that the federal gov‐
ernment could not have constitutionally created a national health‐
care program by other means.28
Similarly, a hypothetical national healthcare program
could potentially impose specific requirements that might
violate individual rights. A healthcare program that pre‐
vented persons from seeking certain types of medical treat‐
ment or independently paying for their own healthcare ser‐
vices might run afoul of constitutional limitations.29 But even
if the government were to impose such requirements, only
the provisions violating individual rights would be invalid;
the basic provision of healthcare by the federal government
would remain untouched.30
26. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health
Insurance Mandate is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581, 583–84 (2010).
27. Such a decision, no doubt, would threaten the continued viability of PPACA
because of funding concerns. For example, PPACA’s abolishment of preexisting
condition exclusions depends upon the individual mandate, to keep insurance
premiums low by having healthy individuals in the insurance pool along with
individuals with pre‐existing conditions. Troy J. Oechsner & Magda Schaler‐
Haynes, Keeping it Simple: Health Plan Benefit Standardization and Regulatory Choice
Under the Affordable Care Act, 74 ALB. L. REV. 241, 283 (2010).
28. A holding that the individual mandate is unconstitutional combined with
a ruling that the provision is nonseverable would, of course, invalidate the en‐
tire PPACA. This would not mean, however, that the government could not
provide national healthcare through another mechanism. The constitutional
challenges to PPACA have spawned some disagreement among the lower
courts concerning the severability issue. Compare Florida v. HHS, 648 F.3d 1235,
1327–28 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that the individual mandate is severable from
the rest of the Act), with Florida v. HHS, 780 F. Supp. 201 1256, 1305 (N.D. Fla.
2011) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that the
individual mandate is not severable).
29. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 US 113 (1973) (holding that there is a constitu‐
tional right for a woman to have an abortion). The government, of course, pre‐
sumably could choose to refrain from paying for certain types of medical treat‐
ments if it so decided. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (holding that there
is no right to a state subsidized abortion).
30. One might assert another type of constitutional argument against national
healthcare—specifically, that the welfare state is fundamentally inconsistent with
our constitutional structure. The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, after all, de‐
mands that the States may have only republican forms of government. See U.S.
CONST. art IV, § 4, cl. 1 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government . . . .“). A parallel argument could be
advanced that the federal government similarly requires that the United States
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NATIONAL HEALTHCARE AND CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE

Even though a national healthcare program would be legally
constitutional in the sense of not violating any specific formal con‐
stitutional requirement, it might not still be consistent with our
constitutional traditions or constitutional culture.31 This Part will
explore that possibility. To proceed, however, we first need to de‐
velop some sense of what we mean by “constitutional culture” in
this setting as constitutional culture is a term that can hold a vari‐
ety of meanings.32 Consider, for example, the difference in the
meanings of the term “constitutional culture” in the two opinions
in which a Supreme Court Justice has actually employed the term.
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,33 Justice Scalia used the
term to find a constitutional prohibition against so‐called “regula‐
tory takings” or takings in which the government does not seize
and the States must have a laissez‐faire based economy. The problems with such a
theory, of course, are legion. First, unlike the Guarantee Clause, there is no textual
basis for such a claim. Second, the Guarantee Clause imposes limits only upon the
States and not the federal government and, indeed, actually empowers the federal
government to act against the States. Third, the Guarantee Clause has not proven
to have much content. It does not prevent States from using direct democracy
mechanisms such as initiatives and referenda, rather than legislatures, to enact
laws, see Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912), and
has not even been interpreted to require that state legislative bodies be fairly ap‐
portioned. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
31. Indeed, Justice McReynolds appeared to make a similar claim regarding the
legality of Social Security in his Steward Machine dissent. Quoting President Frank‐
lin Pierce, McReynolds wrote: “I can not find any authority in the Constitution for
making the Federal Government the great almoner of public charity throughout
the United States. To do so would, in my judgment, be contrary to the letter and
spirit of the Constitution and subversive of the whole theory upon which the Un‐
ion of these States is founded.” Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 603
(1937) (McReynolds, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
32. See, e.g., Doni Gewirtzman, Glory Days: Popular Constitutionalism, Nostalgia
and the True Nature of Constitutional Culture, 93 GEO. L.J. 897, 899 (2005) (defining
constitutional culture as “a larger community‐wide discourse that includes judi‐
cial and nonjudicial actors, a mixture of legal norms and political actions, and a
wide range of interpretive expression”); Jason Mazzone, The Creation of a Constitu‐
tional Culture, 40 TULSA L. REV 671, 672 (2005) (describing constitutional culture as
the relationship between the people and the Constitution, that the people recog‐
nize the Constitution’s authority and reach, that it was created by the people, and
that it is not set in stone but can be changed or revoked by the people); Reva B.
Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: the
Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1349 (2006) (recognizing the flexibil‐
ity that the Constitution provides, constitutional culture is what allows new un‐
derstandings to be created and upheld, so long as these understandings take a
form that “officials can enforce and the public will recognize as the Constitution”).
33. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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an owner’s property but rather deprives the land of any economi‐
cally beneficial use by imposing regulatory restrictions on its
use.34 Based upon his understanding of what constitutional cul‐
ture entailed, Justice Scalia then concluded that an anti‐erosion
measure that prevented a landowner from building on his prop‐
erty was unconstitutional because it rendered the owner’s land
valueless without compensation.35 For Justice Scalia, principles
derived from constitutional culture can have actual legal force.36
Chief Justice Rehnquist, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,37 however, used the term constitutional
culture in an entirely different way. For Chief Justice Rehnquist,
constitutional culture is akin to the beliefs about constitutional
meaning that are embedded in what he calls the “national psy‐
34. For a discussion of regulatory takings, see Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544
U.S. 528 (2005). As the Court in Lingle explained, regulatory takings arise when a
government’s regulatory action is “so onerous that its effect is tantamount to a
direct appropriation or ouster . . . .” Id at 537.
35. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028.
36. For the argument that Justice Scalia’s reliance on constitutional culture is incon‐
sistent with his originalist methodology see, for example, William W. Fisher III, The
Trouble with Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1399–1400 (1993) (arguing that Justice Scalia’s
use of the term “constitutional culture” in Lucas might suggest that “the relevant social
contract is not the one supposedly entered into by the persons who ratified the original
Constitution and its first set of amendments, but rather the one entered into by the
government and the current citizens of the United States when the latter first became
active members of the polity”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and
Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 81 (1992) (Justice Scalia’s use of the phrase “constitu‐
tional culture” in Lucas might indicate that “[t]he culture and customs of the people
have become his interpretive guide and apparently now ‘tradition is a living thing’ for
him as well”); William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings
Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 808 (1995) (“Justice Scaliaʹs ap‐
proach in Lucas is at odds with his announced commitment to a doctrine of originalism
and his explanation of what originalism means.”).
37. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Justice Scalia’s opinion in Lucas and Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s in Casey are the only instances, according to my research, where a
Supreme Court Justice has used the actual term “constitutional culture.” The Jus‐
tices, have, of course, used such parallel terms as constitutional tradition in a vari‐
ety of cases. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003) (“We have long
recognized that, given the important purpose of public education and the expan‐
sive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university environment,
universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition.”); Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997) (“Even assuming [that certain laws] repre‐
sent assertion of the very same congressional power challenged here, they are of
such recent vintage that they are no more probative than the statute before us of a
constitutional tradition that lends meaning to the text.”); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 731, 749 (1982) (“We consider this immunity a functionally mandated inci‐
dent of the Presidentʹs unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of the
separation of powers and supported by our history.”).
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che.”38 Thus, in responding to the joint opinion’s claim in Casey
that the people of this country have “ordered their thinking and
living around”39 the right to abortion set forth in Roe v. Wade,40
Chief Justice Rehnquist questioned how that opinion could
“view the ‘central holding’ of Roe as so deeply rooted in our con‐
stitutional culture, when it so casually uproots and disposes of
that same decisionʹs trimester framework.”41
The current public debate over national healthcare, includ‐
ing the accompanying articles by Professors Rabkin42 and
Rao43 in this volume of the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Pol‐
icy, tends to use the term constitutional culture more in line
with Chief Justice Rehnquist’s meaning of the term in Casey
than Justice Scalia’s meaning in Lucas. That is, it uses the term
to refer to the set of American traditions, narratives, and un‐
derstandings that guide popular perception of what the Con‐
stitution means and not, as in Lucas, an actual constitutional
protection under which the constitutionality of a particular
legislative enactment can be formally adjudged. This Article,
accordingly, will use the term “constitutional culture” in the
same manner.44
A.

Constitutional Culture and the Arguments
Against National Healthcare

There are at least two fundamental aspects of our constitu‐
tional culture that can be used to argue against national health‐
care. The first is our traditional celebration of rugged individu‐
alism and the individual who decides the major choices in life
38. Casey, 505 U.S. at 957 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
39. Id. at 856 (joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, JJ.).
40. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
41. Casey, 505 U.S. at 957 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
42. Rabkin, supra note 5.
43. Neomi Rao, American Dignity and Healthcare Reform, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 171 (2012).
44. For scholarly works addressing the meaning of “constitutional culture,”
see, for example, Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitu‐
tion, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 549, 592 (2009) (defining constitutional culture as “what
ordinary citizens and legal and political elites believe the Constitution means
and who they believe has authority to make claims on the Constitution”); J.M.
Balkin, What is a Postmodern Constitutionalism?, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1966, 1978
(1992) (“[T]he way that the courts, Congress, and the executive interact with
each other, and the way that law is understood, promulgated, argued about,
experienced, and assimilated.”).
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for herself. The second is distrust of government. Each will be
discussed in turn.
1.

Rugged Individualism

The vision of the rugged individual is a powerful one and
generally a good one. The belief that we are the “masters of our
fate,” in Neomi Rao’s words,45 has no doubt contributed to the
deep spirit of optimism that Americans enjoy and the degree of
accomplishment and innovation that we have achieved as a
society. It also is one of the reasons why we so stubbornly and
laudably resist any encroachments on what we perceive are our
individual freedoms.46
But the individualist claim runs up against a number of
harsh realities that diminish its force. Some of these realities are
the result of historical change. In upholding Social Security, for
example, the Court in Helvering v. Davis expressly referenced
historical change, noting that in the “pioneer days,” Americans
could move to unsettled areas and physically escape from
whatever bad economic conditions had enveloped them.47 By
the 1930s, however, as Helvering recognized, the “hinterland”
had closed and these opportunities were no longer available.48
Programs such as Social Security, therefore, became necessary.
Societal changes since the 1930s have only exacerbated the
weaknesses in the individualist account. The entry costs
needed to succeed in this economy, for example, are far greater
because of shifts in the types of jobs that are available and be‐
cause of the greater expectations placed on those joining the
workforce. One reason for this is education. Succeeding in the
current economy requires sophisticated training that cannot be
mastered by the individual acting alone.49
The individualist account also has been weakened because
population expansion and the changing of the economy from
primarily agricultural to manufacturing to high‐tech to infor‐
45. See Rao, supra note 43.
46. See generally Rabkin, supra note 5.
47. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 641 (1937).
48. Id.
49. See generally COURTNEY MCSWAIN & RYAN DAVIS, INST. FOR HIGHER EDUC.
POLICY, COLLEGE ACCESS FOR THE WORKING POOR: OVERCOMING BURDENS TO
SUCCEED IN HIGHER EDUCATION (2007), available at http://www.ihep.org/
assets/files/publications/a‐f/CollegeAccessWorkingPoor.pdf.
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mation‐based, have created more intricate and unavoidable
interdependencies among citizens and communities—an inter‐
dependency for which the individualist model cannot begin to
account. It has become popular recently for some to criticize
the Supreme Court’s decision in Wickard v. Filburn,50 which
held that the Commerce Clause extended to the regulation of
wheat grown for on‐farm use. But the economics of that deci‐
sion were correct.51 In an integrated economy, wheat grown for
home consumption in a small farm in Ohio does affect the price
of the commodity nationwide.52
The individualist model also is under siege because its corol‐
lary implication that unencumbered individualism leads to the
betterment of American society as a whole also has become
more difficult to support as a sustaining myth. A recent article
in The Atlantic, for example, noted that the major beneficiaries
of the expansion of the global economy are a wealthy class of
global elites who have no particular national allegiance at all.53
There is no American exceptionalism in such an economy.
There is only concentrated wealth—with much of it lying out‐
side American borders.
Finally, any discussion of the merits of the individualist as‐
sertion also must take into account corporate power. Al‐
though the virtues of limited government often are ex‐
pounded as part of the individualist account, it often is
forgotten that the primary beneficiaries of nonregulation are
corporations. This is significant. The Framers, for example,
never celebrated corporate power as a form of individual
freedom. They distrusted the corporate form.54 Accordingly,
corporations were highly regulated during the founding era.
Corporate charters were limited in scope55 and the activities of
corporations were tightly monitored.56
50. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
51. For one criticism, see LIBERTY LEGAL FOUNDATION, What’s Wrong with
Wickard?, http://www.libertylegalfoundation.net/574/whats‐wrong‐with‐wickard/.
52. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 19 (2005).
53. Chrystia Freeland, The Rise of the New Global Elite, ATLANTIC, Jan./Feb. 2011, at 44.
54. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 949 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“It was assumed that [corporations] were legally privileged organizations that had
to be closely scrutinized by the legislature because their purposes had to be made
consistent with public welfare.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
55. Rather than gaining corporate status through general corporate law, corpora‐
tions in the post‐Revolutionary War period were specifically chartered by the state.
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The nature of the corporate entity bears out the Framers’
skepticism. Corporations have the legal obligation to maximize
shareholder profits—not to better the world around them.57 Al‐
though improving shareholder profit can at times coincide
with the national interest, this is not always the case. Without
externally imposed environmental regulations, for example,
corporations would be unlikely to spend much to curb pollu‐
tion because there is little or no financial incentive for them to
do so.58 Without labor law regulations, corporations might be
tempted to engage in objectionable cheap labor measures such
as using child labor.59 Without safety regulations, corporations
might engage in cost‐cutting that would result in the manufac‐
ture of defective or dangerous products.60
Their businesses were generally of a public character, such as operating banks or
establishing companies to build bridges and roads. Corporations were not formed
automatically, but were created through special legislative acts: a special bill had to
be put before the state legislator, it would have to pass both houses, and the gover‐
nor would have to sign the bill into existence before a corporation could be formed.
JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 2:3
(3d ed. 2010) (discussing the early history of American corporations).
56. Id.
57. See Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Mak‐
ing Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON
L. REV. 23, 23 (1991).
58. Andrew G. Keeler, Regulatory Objectives and Enforcement Behavior, ENVTL.
RES. ECON., July 2005, at 73, 73–85.
59. See Dana C. Nicholas, Note, China’s Labor Enforcement Crisis: International In‐
tervention and Corporate Social Responsibility, 11 SCHOLAR 155, 156–58 (2009) (argu‐
ing that without regulation or enforcement, economic pressure for high output at
low cost can be an irresistible inducement to using child labor).
60. See UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1906). Corporate actions in pursuit of
profit can, and have, endangered the national interest in others ways. Abuses in
the financial markets causing serious economic crises are almost too numerous to
mention. See generally ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY
OF HOW WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYS‐
TEM FROM CRISIS—AND THEMSELVES (2009); RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF
CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ’08 AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION (2009).
My point about how corporate power can lead to results other than social bet‐
terment can be illustrated, however, by a different kind of example. In 1996, The
New York Times ran an article on W. R. Timken, Jr., the then‐head of the Timken
Corporation in Canton, Ohio, and his connections to the Republican Party. In
noting the Timken Corporation’s relative lack of success on Wall Street, the Times
reported as follows:
The rap on the Timken Company from Wall Street analysts is that it
could be even more profitable if it would only be more aggressive about
downsizing its work force of 18,000, if it were not so preoccupied with
striving to produce the highest quality bearing and steel products in the
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But what does the decline of the descriptive accuracy of the
rugged individual have to do with healthcare? The answer is
quite a bit. Even if we celebrate the individual as master of her
fate, the individual is not, after all, the master of her own
health. Developments in transportation and population
growth, among other factors, makes our respective medical
conditions interdependent on each other. Just as we can no
longer run away to the “hinterland[s]” to escape economic
hardship,61 we can no longer completely insulate ourselves
from the effects of others’ health. If someone sneezes in North
Carolina today, for example, that action may negatively affect
someone’s health in Minnesota tomorrow. If a highly conta‐
gious epidemic breaks out at O’Hare International Airport in
Chicago tomorrow, it is not unlikely that every state in the
country will feel its effects by next week.
The economics of healthcare also are not insular to the individ‐
ual. The individual’s healthcare decisions affect the price, quality,
and availability of healthcare products and services for all the
people around him.62 The individual’s decision not to buy health
insurance raises the costs of healthcare for all of those around
him,63 particularly if he is not able to independently pay for all of

world and if it was less worried about its responsibility to the people of
Canton.
“The company is so focused on quality and its reputation and pleasing
its customers,” said . . . an analyst with Smith Barney, “to some degree, it
hurts profit margins.”
Michael Winerip, Canton’s Biggest Employer is Out of Step, and That’s Fine With Him,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1996, at B8.
Perhaps, then, it is a part of our constitutional culture to limit government in
order to respect the rights of individuals to frame their own destinies, as Jeremy
Rabkin contends. See Rabkin, supra note 5. But I am not sure that our constitu‐
tional culture should be interpreted as including a set of incentives that discour‐
age community responsibility, protecting the workforce, and manufacturing the
best products in the world.
61. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 641 (1937).
62. Cf. Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 19 (2005).
63. See Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 893–94 (E.D. Mich.
2010) (“The decision whether to purchase insurance or to attempt to pay for health
care out of pocket . . . [has] clear and direct impacts on health care providers, taxpay‐
ers, and the insured population who ultimately pay for the care provided to those who
go without insurance . . . . [C]hoosing to forgo insurance . . . collectively shift[s] billions
of dollars, $43 billion in 2008, onto other market participants.”), aff’d 651 F.3d 529 (6th
Cir. 2011).
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his eventual healthcare.64 The bankruptcy that a person suffers
because she was not able to pay her medical bill affects her
neighbors and her community. Healthcare, in short, is the classic
example of something which we are, in fact, all in together.
2.

Distrust of Government

A second narrative militating against national healthcare is
distrust of government. Again, the principle is deeply in‐
grained in our constitutional culture. It is expressly codified in
the Bill of Rights by the creation of specific individual liberties
that lie against the state.65 It also is evidenced in the constitu‐
tional structures of separation of powers and federalism that
are designed to dilute government authority.66
The distrust of government narrative has been invaluable in
protecting us from the types of totalitarian mischief that have
engulfed other countries, and I, for one, do not need to be con‐
vinced of the depth and importance of maintaining a healthy
level of government distrust for preserving our democratic sys‐
tem.67 It is the prime reason, for example, for opposing concen‐
trating power in the presidency.68
64. Under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, hospitals may
not turn away indigent patients who have no money to pay for their emergency care.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2003).
65. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend I.
66. U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000) (“The ‘constitutionally mandated
balance of power’ between the States and the Federal Government was adopted by the
Framers to ensure the protection of ‘our fundamental liberties’”) (quoting Atascadero
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (internal quotations omitted))).
67. After all, I grew up in New Hampshire, a state whose motto is “Live Free or
Die.” Of course, New Hampshire’s insistence that this motto be displayed on all
state license plates once led the state to run afoul of the First Amendment. See
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (upholding a First Amendment challenge
to New Hampshire’s mandatory display of the state motto on its license plates).
68. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, Eleven Reasons Why Presidential Power Inevitably
Expands and Why It Matters, 88 B.U. L. REV. 505, 506 (2008); William P. Marshall,
Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, and Lessons from the
Divided Executive, 115 YALE L. J. 2446, 2470 (2006).
In this regard, I should point out parenthetically that if one were truly committed
to a general notion of distrust of government, it would make far greater sense to be
more opposed to concentrating power in the presidency than in the Congress be‐
cause allowing one person to exercise power secretly and unilaterally is far more
dangerous than allowing five hundred thirty‐five persons to exercise power through
legislative deliberation and compromise. I also would suggest that if the motivating
concern of expansive federal power is the threat of government tyranny, we should
be far more wary of efforts to allow a President to imprison and detain American

No. 1]

Healthcare and Constitutional Culture

145

That said, problems also arise when a government is too
weak. One of the primary motivating concerns animating the
adoption of the Constitution was, after all, that the Articles of
Confederation created a national government with insuffi‐
cient authority to meet the demands of a burgeoning nation.69
As this early history taught us, a strong central government is
necessary not only for national defense but also for resisting
the parochial interests that come to the fore when power is
too decentralized.70
Equally fundamental, strong government is necessary to
combat the abuses of the private sector. As discussed earlier,
the profit motive is one that easily leads to abuse,71 and for that
reason one of our other cultural narratives is a distrust of pri‐
vate power. After all, when the mythic cowboy hero rode into
town to fight for justice, he was generally not fighting for
trickle‐down economics. He was often fighting a landed gentry
that was not allowing co‐citizens the opportunity to succeed.
The problem with overly limiting the power of government, in
short, is that it leads to another type of social ill, the unchecked
dominance of entrenched power elites.72
citizens without outside oversight than attempts to allow the Congress to provide a
system of national healthcare—even if such a healthcare system imposes a mandate
on some to purchase health insurance. Cf. Padilla v. Hanft, 432 F.3d 582, 583 (4th Cir.
2005) (noting the apparent attempt of the United States government to avoid judicial
review of the legality of seizing an American citizen pursuant to the war on terror).
69. See Max Farrand, The Federal Constitution and the Defects of the Confederation, 2
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 532, 532 (1908) (“That the Constitution was framed because of
defects in the Articles of Confederation is universally accepted . . . .”); see also
Robert L. Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More States Than One, 47 HARV. L.
REV. 1335, 1337 (1934) (“The Constitutional Convention was called because the
Articles of Confederation had not given the Federal Government any power to
regulate commerce.”).
70. 1 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 321 (J.B. Lippincott &
Co., 1865) (1787) (As James Madison observed in discussing the shortcomings of
decentralized regulation of commerce, “[t]he practice of many States in restricting
the commercial intercourse with other States . . . tends to beget retaliating regula‐
tions . . . destructive of the general harmony.”).
71. See supra notes 54–60 and accompanying text.
72. At this point it might be argued that even if government power is necessary to
combat private‐sector abuse, that power does not have to be exercised at the federal
level. Enforcement power against private excess could still be maintained at the state
level without feeding the federal behemoth. I share part of this sentiment in that I be‐
lieve that state and federal power are imbalanced and that more enforcement should
be pursued at the state level. I see no reason, for example, why crimes like carjacking
should become federal offenses. See William P. Marshall, American Political Culture and
the Failures of Process Federalism, 22 HARV. J.L & PUB. POL’Y 139, 145 (1998). Indeed I
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Limiting government also means that deep societal problems
might never be remedied. True, there are reasons to distrust
whether government will act efficiently. A government‐run
healthcare program runs the risk of bloat, but history has taught
us that the private sector is not always efficient or pristine either.
Moreover, even if the caricature of private‐sector efficiency is
maintained, there is one thing about private‐sector behavior that
is certain—the private sector will not act when it is not in its
economic interest to do. A laissez‐faire private health insurance
system may well work for some, but it provides no incentive for
companies to insure those with pre‐existing conditions or those
who are unable to afford minimal insurance costs.73
B.

Constitutional Culture and the Arguments
In Favor of National Healthcare
1.

Maintenance of Social Mobility

One of the most sustaining narratives in our constitutional
culture is that unlike the Europeans we live in a class‐free soci‐
ety.74 Indeed, our cultural, if not political, separation from Eng‐
land was based in part on the rejection Old World’s class‐based

have devoted major parts of my career to working in state government. But, for exactly
this reason, I know state government’s limitations firsthand. In my time with the Min‐
nesota Office of the Attorney General our office tried to sue one of the major oil com‐
panies for pricing violations. But the reality was that we did not have the resources to
do the job right. We were outmanned, outgunned, and outspent. More recently, when
I served as the Solicitor General of Ohio I had to deal with the fact that we could only
afford to give our first‐year lawyers salaries in the low $40,000’s. Contrast that figure
with the salaries given to first‐year lawyers in the large firms and ask whether state
government can truly be an effective check against large private‐sector abuse. The only
entity that can stand up to the excesses of large corporate power is the federal gov‐
ernment. Most, if not all, state attorneys general offices simply do not have the size to
take on large multinational corporations on complex legal matters. A notable excep‐
tion to this is the litigation brought by the states against the tobacco companies, but
those suits were only able to succeed by the hiring of private counsel and the possibil‐
ity of massive damage awards at the end of the litigation. David A. Dana, Public Inter‐
est and Private Lawyers: Toward a Normative Evaluation of Parens Patriae Litigation by
Contingency Fee, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 315, 317–19 (2001).
73. See Karen Eggleston, Risk Selection and Optimal Health Insurance‐Provider
Payment Systems, J. RISK INS., June 2000, at 173, 174.
74. See Middle of the Class, ECONOMIST, July 14, 2005, at 9–13 (noting “[a] decline
in social mobility would run counter to Americans’ deepest beliefs about their
country”); see also Ever higher society, ever harder to ascend, ECONOMIST, Jan. 1, 2005,
at 22–24 (discussing belief in American meritocracy).

No. 1]

Healthcare and Constitutional Culture

147

systems that inhibited the individual’s chances to get ahead.75
And in fact, the belief in American exceptionalism could be just
as much about our Nation’s rejection of class as it is about our
rejection of a comprehensive welfare state. Caste as well as wel‐
fare can work to undercut the individual sense of dignity about
which Professor Rao is concerned.76 Caste as well as welfare
can undercut the individual’s sense of optimism and ambition
celebrated in Professor Rabkin’s Article.77
The problem, of course, is that the descriptive accuracy of
the United States as a class‐free nation is fading. Social mobil‐
ity in the United States is now lower than in many European
countries.78 In fact, we are beginning to take on the vestiges of
the class‐based society from which we originally rebelled.79
Social mobility, for example, is stagnant particularly at the
highest and lowest ends of the economic spectrum.80 Fully
forty‐two percent of children born into the bottom quintile
and thirty‐nine percent of children born into the top quintile
remain in the same quintile as their parents.81 Similarly, ac‐
cording to one study of intragenerational mobility, about fifty
percent of individuals who start in the bottom quintile remain
there ten years later.82 Meanwhile, in 2007 a mere 130,000
families received eleven percent of our nation’s wealth.83 In‐

75. See Ever higher society, supra note 74, at 22. Consistent with this principle the
Constitution provides that “No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United
States . . . .” U.S. CONST. art 1., § 9.
76. See Rao, supra note 43.
77. See Rabkin, supra note 5.
78. The Economic Mobility Project, an initiative of the Pew Charitable Trusts,
has classified the United States, along with the United Kingdom and Italy, as
“low‐mobility countries” while studies tend to group Canada, Sweden, Norway,
Finland and Denmark as having higher rates of mobility than the United States.
See JULIA B. ISAACS, ECON. MOBILITY PROJECT, ECONOMIC MOBILITY OF FAMILIES
ACROSS GENERATIONS 5 (2007).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See GREGORY ACS & SETH ZIMMERMAN, LIKE WATCHING GRASS GROW? AS‐
SESSING CHANGES IN U.S. INTRAGENERATIONAL ECONOMIC MOBILITY OVER THE
PAST TWO DECADES 6 (2008).
83. Bob Herbert, A Recovery’s Long Odds, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2010, at A29; see
also Nicholas D. Kristof, Taxes and Billionaires, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2011, at A23 (not‐
ing that the top one percent of Americans have more collective wealth than the
bottom ninety percent of Americans).
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deed, not only is American society less mobile than before,84
but Americans are now becoming increasingly pessimistic
about the future mobility of their children.85 No wonder so
many are lamenting the end of the American Dream.
Enter healthcare. The importance of healthcare to social mobil‐
ity cannot be overstated.86 Access to healthcare is critical to mo‐
bility. Many people have to stay in their jobs because of fear of
losing their health insurance if they pursue other options.87 And
even aside from maintaining insurance coverage, healthcare has
particularly strong influence on social mobility in the manner it
affects individuals entering and exiting employment.88
Healthcare and social mobility are clearly entwined in other
ways.89 Numerous studies have shown that health inequalities
and social class inequalities are linked,90 and that health issues

84. “[The] American Dream . . . is showing signs of wear, with both public per‐
ceptions and concrete data suggesting that the nation is a less mobile society than
once believed.” ISABEL V. SAWHILL & JOHN E. MORTON, ECON. MOBILITY PROJECT,
ECONOMIC MOBILITY: IS THE AMERICAN DREAM ALIVE AND WELL? 13 (2007).
85 Fifty‐nine percent of Americans today think that it will be harder for their
children to climb the income ladder, compared with only forty‐six percent in 2009.
Letter from The Mellman Group, Inc. & Public Opinion Strategies to the Economic
Mobility Project (May 17, 2011), http://www.economicmobility.org/poll2011/
Mellman_Poll_Document.pdf.
86. To be sure, some of the issues dealing with social mobility that are discussed
in this section might be products of poor health rather than poor healthcare. But
the two are inherently related. Preventative healthcare promotes long‐term health,
and the economic circumstances of someone facing a healthcare crisis are not as
dire when her medical bills are covered by her medical insurance as when she has
to incur the full cost herself.
87. David Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment‐Based Health Insur‐
ance, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 23, 28 (2001); see also Ezra Klein, More
Americans Fear Losing Their Health Insurance Than Being in a Terrorist Attack, AMERICAN
PROSPECT, May 21, 2008, available at http://www.alternet.org/health/85947.
88. Myung Ki et al., Health selection operating between classes and across employment
statuses, J. EPIDEMIOLOGY CMTY HEALTH, Sept. 4, 2010, available at
http://jech.bmj.com/content/early/2010/09/01/jech.2009.107995.full.pdf (demonstrating
that health is a predictor for social mobility when leaving and entering employment).
89. For a clear illustration on the relationship between poor health and inequality,
see Alexander Hertel‐Fernandez, The Corrosive Effects of Inequality on Health, ECON.
POL’Y INST. (Jan. 19, 2010), http://www.epi.org/economic_snapshots/entry/
snapshot_20100119/; see also Myung Ki, Health Selection and Health Inequalities (2009)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University College London), available at
eprints.ucl.ac.uk/18913/18913.pdf.
90. For the seminal report demonstrating the relationship between health ine‐
qualities and class, see Peter Townsend & Nick Davidson, Inequalities in Health:
The Black Report (1982).

No. 1]

Healthcare and Constitutional Culture

149

have been shown to play a large role in personal bankruptcy.91
Furthermore, although not all poor health results from poor
health care, there is demonstrated correlation between poor
health and downward mobility.92 Most profoundly, poor health
has lasting effects on the social mobility of children, both in their
early and adult years.93 The unavailability of healthcare to re‐
dress poor health issues can therefore freeze an individual in a
lower class for life,94 a not insignificant social problem when one
considers that there are currently 8.1 million children in the
United States without health insurance.95
Any constitutional cultural commitment to the rejection of a
class system, then, would seem to virtually require healthcare,
not merely permit it. If healthcare is essential to social mobility
and social mobility expresses who we are as a nation, then pro‐
viding healthcare is consistent with who we are as nation.
2.

Equal Opportunity

The final part of our constitutional culture that I will discuss
might be the most celebrated of all—equality of opportunity.96
91. See, e.g., Melissa B. Jacoby & Mirya Holman, Managing Medical Bills on the
Brink of Bankruptcy, 10 YALE. J. HEALTH POL’Y & ETH. 239, 261–62, 286 (2010) (re‐
porting on range of estimates of medical‐related bankruptcy, including the recent
estimate of sixty‐two percent, and critiquing alternative method of measurement);
Melissa B. Jacoby & Elizabeth Warren, Beyond Hospital Misbehavior: An Alternative
Account of Medical‐Related Financial Distress, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 535, 551 (2006)
(using 2001 data, reporting ways to estimate medical‐related bankruptcy as a per‐
centage of all personal bankruptcy filers and finding that medical‐related bank‐
ruptcy accounts for up to sixty‐three percent); Melissa Jacoby et al., Rethinking the
Debates over Health Care Financing: Evidence from the Bankruptcy Courts, 76 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 375, 377 (2001) (showing that in 1999 “[n]early half of all bankruptcies in‐
volved a medical problem”).
92. See GREGORY ACS & SETH ZIMMERMAN, ECON. MOBILITY PROJECT, SUMMARY OF
KEY FINDINGS: U.S. INTRAGENERATIONAL ECONOMIC MOBILITY FROM 1984 TO 2004:
TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS (2008); see also Steven A. Haas, Health Selection and the Proc‐
ess of Social Stratification: The Effect of Childhood Health on Socioeconomic Attainment, 47 J.
OF HEALTH & SOC. BEHAVIOR 339–54 (2006); Myung Ki et al., supra note 88.
93. Haas, supra note 92, at 349 (noting that poor health in childhood has significant,
direct and large adverse effects on education attainment and wealth accumulation).
94. See generally ISAACS, supra note 78.
95. CHILDREN’S DEFENSE FUND, STATE OF AMERICA’S CHILDREN 2010 REPORT, at xiii
(2010), available at http://www.childrensdefense.org/child‐research‐data‐publications/
data/state‐of‐americas‐children‐2010‐report.html
96. Equality of opportunity and social mobility are, of course, related. But al‐
though social mobility is concerned with the ability of the individual to move
across class lines and with the corollary harms to society as a whole created when
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The notion that every individual should have equal opportu‐
nity not only is deeply ingrained in our culture but also is fun‐
damental to our constitutional understandings.97 Liberals and
conservatives might disagree as to its meaning, but both sides
are firmly committed to its promise.
There is no equal opportunity, however, for those whose
lives are sidelined by ill health. We all know people who have
had to sacrifice their own educations and opportunities for
advancement because they had to take care of loved ones. We
all have friends who had to abandon their own education and
job opportunities because they were beset by accident, or dis‐
ease, or other kinds of trauma. When this happens, these peo‐
ple are disqualified, through no fault of their own,98 from tak‐
ing advantage of the opportunities that would otherwise have
been available to them.
Healthcare can work to even the playing field for those who
have been sidelined. It can cover the healthcare expenses that
might otherwise be economically disabling. Even more ide‐
ally, it can offer the preventative care that might have less‐
ened the chance that the illness or condition would have de‐
veloped in the first place.
At this point, however, one might argue that our cultural com‐
mitment to equal opportunity does not mean that we believe in
government‐assisted equal opportunity. But this assertion is in‐
correct. We have long recognized that government assistance in
overcoming externally imposed barriers to opportunity is often
necessary.99 That is the lesson of the Civil Rights laws.100 Nor is the
social movement stagnates, equality of opportunity is more personal, reflecting
the ability of the individual to take advantage of whatever options she chooses.
97. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
98. I am not, of course, claiming that all illnesses and traumas are random.
99. Numerous presidents have affirmed the importance of Social Security. See,
e.g., President Richard M. Nixon, Special Message to the Congress on Social Secu‐
rity (Sept. 25, 1969) (“This nation must not break faith with those Americans who
have a right to expect that Social Security payments will protect them and their
families. . . . In the 34 years since the Social Security program was first established,
it has become a central part of life for a growing number of Americans. . . . Almost
all Americans have a stake in the soundness of the Social Security system.”);
President Ronald Reagan, Remarks on Signing the Social Security Amendments of
1983 (Apr. 20, 1983) (“This bill demonstrates for all time our nationʹs ironclad
commitment to Social Security. It assures the elderly that America will always
keep the promises made in troubled times a half a century ago. It assures those
who are still working that they, too, have a pact with the future. From this day
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fallback position persuasive that, unlike antidiscrimination laws,
healthcare assistance does more than simply protect the individ‐
ual’s unencumbered access to opportunity because it subsidizes
that person’s effort rather than merely removing an obstacle.
There might be, as some notable conservatives argue,101 a distinc‐
tion between programs that promote equality of result rather than
equality of opportunity.102 But even if there is such a distinction, it
should not be controversial to place healthcare on the equality of
opportunity end of the spectrum. Money spent for healthcare is
not disposable income. It is spent so the individual can physically
continue to function.
CONCLUSION
National healthcare is not a newfound, radical idea. It was
proposed by political leaders as diverse as Presidents Richard
Nixon and Harry Truman103 and until recently the proposal
enjoyed significant bipartisan support.104 The reason why this
is true is because the concept of national healthcare fits so
well within our constitutional culture and traditions and is
not, as others have argued, inconsistent with our constitu‐
tional commitments. There is nothing in our belief in indi‐
vidualism or in our distrust of government that suggests that
the United States cannot act to alleviate health‐related bur‐
dens on its citizenry.
Currently, there are 52 million people without health insur‐
ance,105 and 8.1 million of them are children.106 These millions
forward, they have one pledge that they will get their fair share of benefits when
they retire.”).
100. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e‐5, 2000e‐16 (2009).
101. But see MICHAEL NOVAK, THE SPIRIT OF DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM 123–25 (1982).
102. David A. Strauss, The Illusory Distinction Between Equality of Opportunity and
Equality of Result, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 171, 173 (1992) (“The call for ‘equality of
opportunity, not equality of result,’ is sometimes offered as a reason for opposing
welfare state measures.”).
103. See Karen Davis, Universal Coverage in the United States: Lessons and Experi‐
ence of the 20th Century, 78 J. URBAN HEALTH 46, 47 (2001).
104. Cf. Michael Isikoff, White House used Mitt Romney health‐care law as blueprint for
federal law, MSNBC.COM (Oct. 11, 2011, 6:05 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/
44854320/ns/politics‐decision_2012/t/white‐house‐used‐mitt‐romney‐health‐care‐law‐
blueprint‐federal‐law/#.TrRCnnLdP48.
105. Pat Wechsler, Americans Without Health Insurance Rise to 52 Million on Job Loss,
Expense, BLOOMBERG (Mar 16, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011‐03‐
16/americans‐without‐health‐insurance‐rose‐to‐52‐million‐on‐job‐loss‐expense.html.
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do not share the level playing field that those of us with
health insurance enjoy. Those that become ill or injured do
not have the path to achievement that hard work and indi‐
vidual initiative provide for the rest of us; instead they be‐
come mired in physical and economic difficulties caused by
matters outside their control.
The promise of American exceptionalism is that it provides a
class‐free society in which all have the equal opportunity to
succeed. National healthcare promotes this vision. It not only
comports with, but also furthers, the best aspects of American
exceptionalism and the ideals that we share as a nation.

106. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.

